As it happens during the metamorphosis of some species, the
world is molting at this time, and shedding its old skin to replace it with a
new one. The parts of the body are still there, but they will take different
forms, and will be given new functions to fulfill. America is one of these
parts, and the question being debated is what new form will it take, and what
new functions will it fulfill?
There are as many opinions on this subject as there are
debaters, of course, but two trends seem to emerge which, between them, seem to
encapsulate most of those opinions. Articles are published all the time in the
daily, weekly and monthly publications, and two of them stand this week as
being representatives of the two major trends. One article was written by
Charles Krauthammer, and it may be called the neocon view; the other was
written by Vali R. Nasr, and it comes closest to representing the mainstream
American view.
The Krauthammer article comes under the title: “Vladimir
Putin Pivots to Asia” and the subtitle: “Russia 's
new energy deal with China
undoes the Kissinger-Nixon achievement.” It was published on May 22, 2014 in
national Review Online. The Nasr article comes under the title: “A Great-Power
Outage” and was published on May 24, 2014 in the New York Times.
Reading the articles, you come out with the sense that in
general, the neocon view is a religious belief based on the principle that the
fate of humanity has been preordained by God the Almighty since the beginning
of time. It regards “our side” as being the good side; one that is locked in a
struggle against the bad guys for dominance over the planet. They believe that
God is on our side which is why we shall triumph in the end. In the meantime,
however, there are those among us – such as our leaders – who do not understand
that their role is to fight for the ultimate goal of total victory regardless
of the cost in life and treasure.
As to the mainstream view, it parallels the pragmatic
attitude that as a nation, you must take life as it comes. Unless you are
threatened physically in which case you fight back to defend yourself, you do
not take anything as being exclusively yours until you have earned it. And you
do that by competing against the other powers for what you want in life. You
compete mindful of the rules that forbid you from stepping on someone else's
toes lest you provoke them needlessly and get into a fight that can bleed you
or that can kill you.
The neocon approach, being at its core a superstition more
than it is a true religion; it regards each and every happening as being a sign
that proves the validity of the Jewish view as to what the natural order of
things ought to be. Thus, Krauthammer considers the gas deal between Russia and China as another sign and a proof
that the preordained order which guided our good side to pull off the
Kissinger-Nixon achievement has been violated by the bad guys who must now be
treated like mortal enemies.
The problem, however, according to the superstition, is that
our leaders have allowed their leaders to secure “a spectacular energy deal”
which demonstrates how “defiant” Putin has become of the natural order of
things, making a “mockery of U.S. boast to have isolated Russia.” And that, in
the view of the neocons is what makes “Obama's own vaunted pivot to Asia ” an embarrassment. And why is that? Because “the
Obama foreign-policy team [does not] understand what is happening.”
At this point, Krauthammer pulls a typical Jewish trick. He
paves the way for advocating what used to be called the 19th-century gun-boat
diplomacy by accusing the other side of practicing it. He begins by calling the
old-style diplomacy “balance-of-power maneuvering,” then discusses the recent
history of the world in a manner that suits his purpose before making a
recommendation. But mindful of the reputation that the neocons have acquired,
he first seeks to tone down the hawkish feel of what he is about to recommend.
He does that by reassuring the readers that his aim is “not
a fight to the finish, but a struggle for dominion and domination.” This done,
he makes his recommendation in a roundabout way. Having accused Obama of
retreating, he now says: “The retreat is compounded by Obama's proposed massive
cuts in defense spending … even as Russia
is rearming and China is
creating a sophisticated military soon capable of denying America access to the waters of the Pacific Rim .” In plain English, this means America must engage into an arms race with both Russia and China no matter the cost, and
regardless of the responses that such decision will trigger on the other side.
And this is what is so much at odds with the mainstream
American view as presented by the Nasr article. Here, the author begins by
admitting that Putin did something that is unusual, unexpected and dangerous:
“It has opened a window on a dangerous confusion among the four leading power
centers of the globe.” But rather than respond in a knee-jerk fashion thus
aggravate the situation, Nasr explains: “each power center interprets the goals
and instruments of strategy – power politics or economic interdependence –
differently.”
He does not minimize the inherent danger in the current
situation, and reinforces that view by asking a series of questions for which
there are no immediate answers. But there is one certainty in all of this, he
says; it is that: “Europe is putting commercial interests above security
interests, and that puts it at odds with American policy.” But does that mean
America now relies or
indeed, should rely on a military response while Europe is looking only at
economic pressure as a means to change the behavior of Russia ?
No, Vali Nasr seems to say, it is that both are using
economics as a strategy to pressure Russia except that each has
developed a different variation of the strategy. Whereas the Europeans, led by Germany “fear more that Russia could make their energy supplies
uncertain and expensive,” Nasr views America 's
grand strategy as pivoting the attention toward Asia
“which could account for two-thirds of global gross domestic product by 2025.”
To end his presentation, he relies on historical
perspectives and explains the confusion that exists between the strategies of
the four power centers: America ,
Europe, Russia and China . This
done, he comes up with his own ultimate recommendation, which is the following:
“This is no time to pivot to Asia so completely [where] America has interest in
managing Russian ambitions – an interest that now demands a rebalancing of
American foreign policy, back to paying primary attention to Europe.”
Nasr is not being more specific than that but his assertion
that a decade from now, two-thirds of the world GDP will be concentrated in Asia , means that the rest of the world will command the
remaining one third. It also means that the combined economic power of America and Europe will be less than half that
of Asia . And this is no time for America to get engaged in an arms race that will
do to America what America did to the old Soviet
Union : provoke its bankruptcy.