They are again coming out of their hiding places to advise America on how to deal with Egypt . To this
end, they are again repeating the same old advice which is this: Act like a
jerk, America ,
because we know precisely what we are talking about. And what we say to you is
that these people respect power. Project power in their region, use every
leverage you have and they will bend to accommodate your dictates.
Well, my friends, those who speak this language are mostly
charlatans; and they do not know what they are talking about but there is wheat
in that pile of chaff. Thus, the thing to do is learn how to find the wheat and
how to separate the two. The approach they use is to impress you with their
power to predict, and yet predicting a future that never comes is where they
fall flat on their faces. Allow them to impress you, and you will pay a stiff price
like you have been paying for half a century. Think about the matter
dispassionately and you will make progress.
In astronomy, you can calculate what the position of a star,
a planet, a moon or an asteroid will be a thousand years from now, even a
million years after that; thus you can launch a probe into space and have it
meet with a designated cosmic body at the predicted position and predicted
time. Also, if you have the map of a terrain, you can plot the rout you will
take to travel from point A to point Z, passing through any number of points
you may wish to inspect in the interim. But what you cannot do is predict how
history will unfold, and you cannot determine ahead of time how other people
will react to situations that are yet to happen.
Nevertheless, there are people – called pundits -- who make
it their business to give advice gratuitously or give it for a fee on how
precisely to handle situations that will never happen because no one knows how
history will precisely unfold. However, this group of people must be set apart
from the legitimate professionals such as the doctors, lawyers, licensed
financial advisers and the like who have the duty to give the best informed
advice they can to situations that lend themselves to observation. The
difference between the two groups is the same as that between the astronomers
who observe and the astrologers who fantasize; between the navigators who
measure and the wanderers who drift aimlessly.
However, there are pundits who give a good piece of advice
once in a while. This happens if and when the pundit is an authentic thinker
that is legitimately motivated by a genuine interest to participate in the
clarification of situations which are in the interest of the public. Thus,
before making use of any advice, whether solicited or given gratuitously, the
executives who seek such advice and take them must learn to look for and spot
the signs that tell who is giving the advice and why they are giving it. These
executives must also have a strategy that will help them avoid the pitfalls
should the advice turn out to be toxic. To this end, the strategy must be to
start slow and proceed while relying on a system of feedback that allows the
executive to measure the progress made every step of the way. Free of dogma, he
or she must be amenable to navigating any sort of terrain with ease and without
prejudice.
Two examples follow, the first being that of a pundit who is
worth listening to; the second being of a pundit whose exposition is nothing
more than an exercise in uselessness.
First, Vali Nasr wrote: “What Pakistan Can Teach the U.S. About Egypt ” It is an
article that was published in Bloomberg News on June 26, 2012. Nasr is a
serious pundit who is generally informed about the subjects on which he writes.
His latest piece is a well crafted exposition of his point of view; one he
makes clear at the beginning is a pessimistic one. However, he gives a hopeful
advice though a dubious one at the end of the article on how the situation can
be rectified. It is an advice that is entirely based on the analysis he does
throughout the article. To get a taste of how the article is structured, here
is the beginning, reprinted in a crammed form: “Egypt has elected a president. That
hardly brightens the transition to true democracy given that the generals made
clear they are in charge.” And here is the end: “That is what set Turkey on its
path to prosperity and democracy. It can work for Egypt , too.”
Between the beginning and the end, Nasr tells the tale of
two countries, Pakistan and Turkey where
the militaries meddled with the work of the elected civilian governments. His
view is that the first tale ended badly whereas the second ended well. He
discusses a number of reasons for the different outcomes, and he comes up with
the advice he predicts will make the Egyptian tale as successful as that of Turkey . Well,
this is a useful and legitimate participation in the debate; one that invites
not a sharp rebuke but a commentary aimed at shedding more light on the
author's analysis. This should help correct the false impression that will be
engendered in the reader given that the Nasr advice is directed at an American audience
concerning an Egyptian culture, the image of which has been mutilated beyond
recognition over the past few decades.
Where Nasr blunders is in his understanding of the Egyptian
economy, of the mentality of the people there and of the motivation behind the
measures taken by the military. He says the following as reprinted again in a
crammed form: “Egypt
rejected a badly needed assistance from the IMF which demanded reforms that
would impinge on the military enterprises that account for a third of the economy.”
This is false on many levels.
The facts are that Egypt did not need a loan from the IMF
(let alone assistance which the IMF never gives) and let alone “badly” needed
it since, as can be verified, Egypt has not received that loan more than a year
later and the economy has not melted as predicted. In fact, Egypt may not
want that loan at all because the people have so demanded given that they do
not want to see their country indebted to a foreign county or an international
organization. As to the size of the military enterprises, it has been shown
over and over how absurd it is to say that they account for a third of the
economy.”
I do not know if Nasr reads Arabic but if I must guess, I
would say he does not because if he did, he would have read the columnists and
the letters to the editor that relentlessly attacked the Mubarak government for
accepting foreign money and for letting foreign influence meddle in Egyptian
affairs. When the people later spoke of a revolution to restore dignity, they meant
the dignity of becoming masters at home by pushing out and replacing the
influence of foreigners on the decision making process of their leaders. Had
the author understood this, he would not have accused the military of being:
“behind raids on NGOs working to promote democracy, including three U.S. groups.”
The truth is that the people of Egypt
were behind that move. And if they will revolt ever again, it will be because
someone forgot to keep the country free of foreign influence.
With this in the background, you can now see how and why the
approach that Nasr says America
should take when dealing with Egypt
must be modified to be effective rather than fail yet again. He writes this:
“In many of their moves, Egypt 's
generals seemed to be following the 1988 script of their Pakistani counterparts
… When she [Bhutto] defied them, the military … dismissed her. It did the same
with her successor and with her again.” What is this? What is he talking
about? The Egyptian president has not
yet been inaugurated, how can the writer speculate he will be dismissed by the
military this much ahead of time?
He now turns his attention toward the Turkish example and,
in doing so, inadvertently points to a huge difference between that country and
Egypt .
He says this: “Turkey 's
military also tightly controlled the democratic process … mostly using the
judiciary to discipline and control politicians.” Obviously, Nasr has no idea
how independent the Egyptian judiciary is. In fact, the supreme court of Egypt
not long ago struck down the military's decision to reinstate marshal law in
the country. If it can do that, it will not “help the military control a
legitimate political process conducted by the politicians.”
Now he asks: “Which way might Egypt go?” To answer the question,
he begins with an inaccuracy that would be irrelevant even if it were true.
This is what he says: “Egypt 's
civilian institutions are weaker than those of either Pakistan or Turkey , whose democratic traditions
date back to the 1950s.” And this is something that prompts us to ask the
following set of questions: What is a civilian institution and what is not? How
can a civilian institution be weaker than another institution? How weak is too
weak? Still, Nasr goes on to say this: “Turkey 's
economy in the early 2000s was stronger than Egypt 's is now.” Is he talking
about the year when Turkey 's
GDP was downgraded by something like 15 percent because it was discovered it
had been grossly overrated? Is he talking about the time when Turkey ’s
hyperinflation made it so that people carried millions of liras to buy a loaf
of bread? One final question in this vein just out of curiosity: How do the
Chinese civilian institutions fare when the Nasr method is used to evaluate the
progress of that nation?
Then comes the big problem. Having painted a view of Egypt that is
incomplete in some places and somewhat distorted in other places, he says this:
“What may matter most is the role of the international community.” He expands
on this by saying don't do with Egypt
what America did with Pakistan ; rather do with it what Europe did with
Turkey .
That is, don't sympathize with the military, but use the $1.3 billion in annual
aid as leverage to “protect Egypt 's
young democracy.” Do that, America
and you will have lost the Egyptian people because blackmail never works with
them. Instead, recognize that nations forge relationships which are of mutual
interest, and then act accordingly.
Second, Tom Friedman wrote: “The Fear Factor” It is a column
that was published in the New York Times on June 27, 2012. He begins it by
quoting someone called Daniel Brumberg who, apparently, came up with a new
theory about the Arabs -- a theory that is not really new but one that is out
of the Jewish cultural and political DNA. He says this: “Arab awakenings
happened because the Arab peoples stopped fearing their leaders – but they
stalled because the Arab peoples have not stopped fearing each other.” Hey
guys, all of you Jewish pundits out there, get this once and for all: the Arabs
do not fear a phantom existential threat that is permanently hanging over their
heads like the Sword of Damocles.
Look around and you will see that the Arabs do not call on
their mouthpieces throughout the world to write hundreds of articles aimed at
instilling fear in the heart of someone like the Iranian nation or any other
nation. They do not instill fear in the hearts of American or European
legislators to force them to prostitute themselves and promote the Jewish
causes. In fact, while the Jewish DNA is made of the four letters FEAR, the
Arab DNA is made of the four letters ACGT like any organic matter you will find
on this planet. Thus, you can think of yourselves as being Semites like us if
you want, but do not make the mistake of thinking of us as being anything like you.
We are not, and we will never be.
Still, my dear reader, Friedman begins with that false
premise to go on and create a fantasy world that is neither here nor there; and
then reaches this predictable conclusion: “The U.S. has some leverage in terms
of foreign aid, military aid and foreign investment – and we would use it …
conditioned on certain principles … What principles? Those identified by the
2002 U.N. Arab Human Development Report, which was written by and for Arabs. It
said that for the Arab world to thrive it needs to overcome its deficit of
freedom, its deficit of knowledge and its deficit of women's empowerment.”
Notice that there is nothing here about fear.
But more than that, the report in question was submitted 10
years ago to the United Nations without the approval of any Arab recognized
institution after 2 years of writing that was based on research done during a
period of time extending between 4 and 8 years before that. Thus, the
information in it – however cherry picked -- is a generation old, collected by
a self-appointed ad hoc group of
activists who meant well but have managed to do nothing more than give a bone
for the likes of Tom Friedman to suckle on and to lick. Think of it as being
useless ancient remains that belong in a museum.