The cook of our story is Steven A. Cook who tried to cook-up
a modern Egyptian plot modeled after an ancient German legend. The latter is a
drama that was given a modern twist centuries later by Johann Goethe about a
man who made a deal with the devil according to which he traded his soul in
exchange for all the knowledge in the world, and all the pleasures of life.
Steve Cook applied his talent writing an article in this vein under the title:
“A Faustian Pact: Generals as Democrats” and had it published in the New York
Times on July 26, 2013.
The trouble is that the Cook story did not go too well. It
was meant to predict a bad ending for the rally that was called for on that day
by the Egyptian military – here representing the character of Faust. The rally
was to be staged throughout the country to denounce the acts of violence that
were being committed by elements of society unhappy with the popular uprising
that overthrew the old order. The rally did take place eventually, the people
of Egypt
seemed to have had a good time staging it, and nothing bad resulted because
there was no soul to trade, and no devil with whom to trade.
So we ask: Where did Steven Cook go wrong in his
understanding of the situation, and his predictions about it? I believe that
his most fundamental misunderstanding of the Egyptian situation is encapsulated
in the following paragraph: “millions of Egyptians welcomed the coup even as
they claimed to want democracy, apparently [they] do not see the tension
between these positions. Their faith in the military is misplaced, but it can
be explained by six decades of hopes and disappointments.”
Cook then makes the classic (and I mean the absolutely,
absolutely classical mistake) that no writer or talking head in America can
avoid making. It is to contradict himself because he is conditioned under
severe blackmail to never (and I mean never, never, never) say something good
about Egypt without wrapping the saying inside a bad thing he must absolutely say
about that country – unless he is prepared to lose his job. Thus, having spewed
the words “misplaced” and “disappointments” to characterize six decades of
relationship between the people of Egypt and their military, he can now say
this: “Since 1952 [that's six decades ago], the armed forces have been Egypt's
state builder, liberator and savior.”
He goes on to say: “That was true when its troops crossed
the Suez Canal in 1973 in a war that
ultimately ended with the Sinai returned from Israeli control. It was even more
true in the years between 1956 and 1967, when Gamal Abdel Nasser and his fellow
Free Officers nationalized the Suez Canal ;
stood firm in the face of a British, French and Israeli invasion; rejected the
terms of Western financing of the Aswan High Dam; and created new economic and
social opportunities for Egyptians.”
Steven Cook goes on to say: “The fact that the Free Officers
delivered on promises of national power, social justice and economic
opportunity provided Mr. Nasser and his comrades a reservoir of support … Mr.
Nasser's heyday still represents, for many, the last time that Egypt felt
united under leaders whose espoused principles met the needs of ordinary
Egyptians … Even now, the elderly could tell me that Mr. Nasser and the army gave
Egypt a gift. New generations share the impression.”
Well, Nasser is undoubtedly the national hero that the
people of Egypt
revere to this day. But they also see the heydays that he started continuing
till at least 5 more years past the 1973 liberation of the Sinai. It happened
under his successor and fellow Free Officer, Anwar Sadat. Thus, it was not
until the end of the Seventies or early Eighties that the people of Egypt began to
feel uneasy. This was a time when the Sadat administration had set aside the
past, and put Egypt
on the fast path to rapid industrialization.
This uneasiness is not peculiar to Egypt . It
happens to all nations that transform from an agrarian society to an industrial
one. How it expresses itself and develops depends on the peculiarities of each
society; and the challenge would have been for scholars (perhaps Steven Cook
among them) to find out what is purely Egyptian in the Egyptian transformation.
To find out what is different about it from say, the Chinese, Indonesian, South
Korean or Filipino experiences. Unfortunately, three decades of opportunities
at studying Egypt
in a scholarly fashion were wasted because the people who are paid to do this
sort of work were forced to spew rubbish instead of producing scholarly work
for the textbooks.
Having skipped the period from that time to the current
situation, Steven Cook tries in his current article to explain what he sees
happen now. But all he does is give an account of the histrionics from the fall
of Mubarak to this day without the depth he could have expressed had he
understood what motivates the people of Egypt . This is why he came to write
something like this: “The ready acceptance of a coup in the name of democracy
is understandable, but at best they are playing with fire.”
Citing a poll in which only 27 percent of the population
expressed its view that a civilian control of the military was “very
important,” he goes on to give his own view as to what would be important for Egypt . But he
admits “Perhaps Egypt
will be different.” Well, I can guaranty him that Egypt will be different in the same
way that every experience is different from all the others.
Like says Desiderata, the universe is unfolding as it should
despite the cooks who wish to cook-up the same meal for everyone.