There may be hope yet for America . Look at the article that
Andrew J. Bacevich wrote under the title: “The misuse of American might, and
the price it pays” and you will see what I mean. The article also came under
the subtitle: “The United
States no longer knows how to win wars, but
it continues to start them.” It was published in Los Angeles Times on January
12, 2014.
He begins with the analogy of the American military being
like a “gadget-toting contractor” who makes big promises but when hired to do
your kitchen, cannot finish the job on time, cannot do it well and cannot do it
on budget. Ever since the end of the Cold War, America has been giving a similar
performance, he says, in the sense that it starts wars and when “we've had
enough” leaves and pretends that the conflict has ended just because American
forces have exited the scene. By way of examples, Bacevich discusses the sorry
state in which Iraq and Afghanistan
find themselves after so much effort, lost blood and lost treasure on all
sides.
At this point, the author of the article begins the process
of explaining how it happened that America found itself this
incompetent when it comes to the use of war as an instrument of foreign policy.
It is that people in the national security establishment confuse “capability
with utility,” he says. And this confusion, he goes on to say, is what leads America to
start wars it knows not how to finish. Well, that's the how of the thing, but
you also want to know the why of it. Why did this happen to America ? No
answer from Andrew Bacevich.
He continues with his observations which, by every measure,
are excellent observations. But again, he tells you the how of the matter but
not the why. For example, speaking of the consequences of America 's approach, he says that instead of
promoting stability, Washington 's
penchant for armed intervention has tended to encourage just the opposite. He
further explains that this approach has played into the hands of the
adversaries, all of whom were “misleadingly lumped together under the rubric of
'terrorists.'” But why did this happen? Still no answer from Andrew Bacevich.
He finally gets to answer what can be construed as a why
question but does so only in general terms. He poses the question this way:
“How can we explain the yawning gap between intention and outcome?” And he
gives an answer that has two components; one being the observation, and the
other being the explanation to that observation. The trouble is that he first
gives the explanation and then makes the observation instead of doing it the
other way around. You'll understand why he did that in a moment.
First, let us look at the observation he makes: “Force is
good for some things, preeminently for defending what is already yours [but]
the United States
has sought to use force to extend its influence, control and values.” So now let us look at his explanation to that
observation: “infatuation with armed might has led senior civilian officials
and military leaders to misunderstand and misapply the military instrument.”
No, the two parts of this answer do not hold together because the author is
hiding something he dares not reveal.
Had he not reversed the order of his answer, he would have
been forced to reveal who those “senior civilian officials and military
leaders” were – and maybe still are. Well, he ducked that part unfortunately,
but he went on to make more excellent observations; one being that “force
employed in faraway places serves to inflame further resistance.” This done, he
asks: “What then is to be done?” And he answers: “Take force off the
metaphorical table to which policy makers regularly refer … The result won't be
a panacea. But it won't cost as much as an open-ended war.”