This article is about the treatment of Middle Eastern
developments – especially Egypt
– in America 's
media. Before I get to the core of my presentation, I'll start with an
observation that's based on real life experiences.
I had cancer, I had an operation, and from all indications I
am now cured of the disease. I say this because I am seen by two doctors in two
hospitals who coordinate the tests I undergo every three months. Well, that was
then. Because the tests have been yielding negative results, their frequency
was reduced to once every six months. And now, they tell me, it will be reduced
again to once a year.
Suppose someone knows all that but talks about me as if I'm
still afflicted with cancer; always prognosticating my upcoming demise. What
should I think of him? Is he worried about my condition? Or is he practicing
wishful thinking to satisfy a deep desire to see my demise in his imagination?
I take the latter.
And that's what I think when I read what is said in America 's publications about Egypt in general; more specifically
what is said about the relationship that exists between that country's economy
and its military. An example of this came in an article that was published
under the title: “How Sisi Could Wreck the Egyptian Economy,” written by Ari
Heistein who is – get this now – at the Institute for National Security Studies
in Israel .
His article appeared on May 4, 2017 in The National Interest. That's supposed
to be America 's national
interest and not Israel 's
… but you couldn't tell.
To be brutally honest, a twelve year old kid in North America can write a better essay about the Egyptian
economy than Heistein's piece of jumbled nothingness. I shall therefore not
waste any time parsing it. I shall, however, pick up on some of the themes he
mentions because they are constantly addressed by those who delve in this
subject whether or not they know what they are talking about.
The first point to discuss pertains to the forces that have
influenced the Egyptian economy early on. Up until the year 1954 – two years
after the abolishment of the monarchy – Egypt was following the
Franco-British system of governance and economics it had inherited. To give the
economy a boost, the government of President Nasser decided to build the Aswan dam and
hydroelectric power station. When it could not obtain a loan to do so, Egypt nationalized the Suez
Canal . The intent was to use the revenues of the Canal to realize
the Aswan
project. What happened subsequent to that is history.
The consequence that reverberated through the decades has
been the foothold that the Soviet Union was able to establish in the Middle East . Forced by circumstances to deal almost
exclusively with the centrally planned economies of the Soviet Bloc, Egypt adopted a
mixed economy whose public component reached 40 percent at its highest point,
leaving 60 percent for the private sector.
This arrangement worked well for Egypt during the decades that
followed, as shown by the growth rate which ranged between 5 percent and 7
percent each and every year. If you want to know why it worked well, you should
study the Chinese economy during the past 25 years. In a nutshell, the
following are the pertinent factors that played a major role: an agrarian economy
that wants to industrialize in a world that's already advanced industrially
cannot rely on its population to come up with the capital, the know-how and the
labor force to do the job. If prohibited from getting outside help, for
whatever reason, the government steps in and does what it can.
This being the hard reality, the government handles the big
infrastructure projects as well as some heavy industries such as mining,
refining, steel making, cement and so forth – to produce the semi-finished
products that feed the small industries the private sector handles during the
early stages of its development. In time, the society will have developed
enough to gradually privatize parts of the public sector. This is what Egypt did, but
other factors specific to the country, have added a number of variations to its
development.
Because everything that was thrust upon Egypt after the 1956 Franco-British attack on
the Suez Canal – came with a military
aggression or the threat of one, the Egyptian military assumed a big role in
the way that the country developed. Since the aggressions were designed to slow
down the economic progress of the country, both the security and the economy
found themselves intertwined. Also, since Egypt
was forced to face the military might of the most advanced colonial powers of
the day, and then the advanced military technology of the United States ,
the Egyptian military had no choice but to place itself at the leading edge of
military technology; developing what it can and importing what it must.
Today, and for the next half century, Egypt will
remain a young society. This means it will be difficult to increase the
workforce beyond a third of the population (it is not even there at this time …
27 million out of 94 million). By comparison, other societies have a workforce
that makes up half the population.
In addition, the history of Egypt since the early fifties
compels every administration to maintain a military that's large enough and
advanced enough to repel any aggression against the nation. This means that a
large number of the country's best educated young men are either drafted in the
army or employed by it. They come in handy when there is a war or the threat of
one.
But these people would be wasted in peace time unless the
military engages in civilian production to help the economy. That's the choice
they made in Egypt .
Thus, while the government is privatizing what remains public from an earlier
era, the military is taking part in the large scale infrastructure projects
that were launched recently. Also, it continues to engage in the hi-tech
industries that the private sector has not yet touched.