Thursday, December 17, 2020

History of Presidents vs History of Issues

 Reviewing and building on a book that was written by Tevi Troy, Clifford D. May's latest article leaves you wondering: What kind of history do these people write and review and talk about?

 

Yes, history begins with people because without them there would be no history. And yes, history is created most of the time because there is conflict between people. But the quality of the history that someone writes will be evaluated by how thorough the issues and policies that led to the conflict, are elaborated on and explained by the writer. The historian that makes the personalities in conflict bigger than the issues, reduces his work to being a treatment for a movie script, not a history book.

 

If Clifford May's article truly reflects the content of Tevi Troy's book, then it must be said that both gentlemen missed their calling. If this is the case, then Tevi Troy should go back to being a specialist in health issues, his original profession, and Clifford May should move to California, to a place called Hollywood where they need new scripts to turn into movies.

 

May's article came under the title: “We can't predict what Biden's foreign policy advisers will advise,” and the subtitle: “Gurus, Svengalis or yes men?” It was published on December 15, 2020 in The Washington Times. As to Troy's book he reviewed, it came under the title: “Fight House: Rivalries in the White House from Truman to Trump,” to which May added the following observation: “advisers to the commander in chief compete –– sometimes productively, sometimes disastrously –– over both power and policies”.

 

By the time you've read Clifford May's article, you'd have realized that Tevi Troy's book is just another American attempt to write yet another presidential history book, this time by an aspiring “Presidential historian.” And this is the defect in the telling of history by Americans. They believe that America is the center of the universe and that the president is both the core and center of American life. In fact, they believe that the intrigues unfolding inside the White House are more important than what is accomplished, if anything is accomplished at all, by those intrigues outside the White House.

 

Clifford May seems to be conscious of that defect, which is why he tried to excuse it at the start of his article with this lame explanation: “In theory, such analysis makes sense. Personnel is policy, and personnel have track records.” Maybe so, but a book of history must be big on the policies that shaped history than the vanity of the people who may or may not have engendered those policies.

 

After all, except to a Hollywood story teller, the inevitability of what ultimately happened to Rome and Egypt is more important than what happened to Julius Caesar and Cleopatra. This is so, unless the historian can show that there is a direct link between what happened to the two countries and what the two leaders did or failed to do.

 

Of the many examples that appeared in Tevi Troy's book, Clifford May chose to mention three of the stories in his article. The following is a condensed version of how he presented them:

 

“For example, during the Nixon administration the rivalry between National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and Secretary of State William Rogers escalated into a feud. President Jimmy Carter chose Cyrus Vance as his secretary of State and Zbigniew Brzezinski as his national security adviser. Initially, they liked each other. It turned out, however, that Brzezinski and Vance disagreed on virtually every key issue that came their way. Unfortunately, the fights contributed to a worsening global situation. The result was unnecessary confusion. President Barack Obama gave Ben Rhodes the title of deputy national security adviser for strategic communications and Speechwriting. Mr. Rhodes' rivalry was with a mindset. Mr. Obama supported his deputy's assault on the blob, the established foreign policy experts”.

 

Upon this, Clifford May saw an opportunity to play contemporary politics. To that end, he first asserted, without explanation, that Mr. Rhodes’s policies have led to failures with regard to the situation in Syria, and the relations with Russia, Cuba and China. Clifford May then added this: “At least regarding Syria, Antony Blinken, whom Biden plans to nominate as secretary of state, has been candid. He admitted, ‘anyone who had responsibility for our Syria policy [must] say we failed –– period’”.

 

This done, Clifford May went on to exploit the occasion, bringing forth and scoring points with regard to his pet beef: the Iran nuclear deal. This is how he played it: “That failed policy was intended to appease Iran’s rulers. With this in mind, it would be logical for Mr. Blinken to advise Mr. Biden against jumping back into Mr. Obama’s Iran nuclear deal with both feet”.

 

Thus, Clifford May has shown that when historians concentrate on the intrigues that go on between the personalities rather that the issues, the result is the creation of fodder for use by subsequent generations who will want to play endless politics and accomplish nothing.