Here is a situation that is so extreme, you wonder if it's
not a case of someone writing an article as a prank and sending it for
publication by mistake. It's a piece that came under the title: “Egypt 's Sisi Is
Getting Pretty Good … at being a Dictator” and the subtitle: “But will the army
continue to back the president if the economy starts to tank?” Attributed to
Thanassis Cambanis, the article was published on May 22, 2015 in Foreign
Policy.
Speaking of Egypt's President, the author reveals at the
outset both his fear that Egypt may succeed at securing domestic tranquility,
and his hope that it will fail under this President: “Sisi has cemented a
ruling coalition that will propel him into a long-term project of power
consolidation … [he] cobbled together a workable formula [that] might be doomed
in the long run, but the long run can be very far off.”
That fear and that hope are based on the belief that the
Sisi governing agenda is based on three things which Cambanis says “give the
impression of vision and positive momentum,” but could in the long run – the
very long run – fail. And so he sets out to tell why these things might work
now but not tomorrow or the day after. They are: first, a crackdown on terror;
second, the maintenance of a flow of cash into Egypt
from the Gulf states ;
and third, the need for economic reform that must be more than modest.
But as you go deeper and deeper into the article, you
realize that the writer may not be relating empirical observations or analysis
thereof with regard to the situation in Egypt . Rather, he could be relating
deep seated wishes for things to go badly in that country. The things he has
under discussion being the following:
First, the “war on terror” will resonate with the Egyptian
people, he says, because even the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood are
repulsed by the terrorist tactics of the insurgency. But he goes on to opine
(or to wish) that as a unifying ideology to mobilize support for Sisi, it may
prove to be insufficient in the long run.
Second, money from the Arab Gulf Egypt struggles
to import enough fuel to keep the country functioning, and enough food staples
to keep the poor quiescent. Without that money, he opines (or wishes), the
summertime power outages would likely turn into long-term blackouts and
electricity rationing. And without money to import food, the rulers of the
country fear a revolution of the poor. That is, he wants you to believe he can
read the mind of these people.
Third, he says that piecemeal improvements to the subsidy
system will serve Sisi for the medium-term. But, he opines (or wishes) that the
President's autocratic ways will preclude creative governance, and thus keep
significant reforms off the table. Having had little to say about the first two
points, he has much to say about the third. And this is where his leanings, political or otherwise – as well as his mental state become apparent as starkly
as can be.
Clearly expressed as a wish more than an observation, he
says that the proposed new capital outside Cairo will probably never be built. He adds
that massive public housing, irrigation, and road works projects will give the
impression (only the impression) of a nation on the move. Nevertheless, he
fears that this will cement deep support for the government in some quarters
such as the wealthy business owners, the influential middle class, the powerful
military; even the political opposition that is the labor movement. This being
the whole country, Cambanis opines (or wishes) that if this will bring medium
term stability to the country, it “may lead to more trouble for Egypt down the
road.”
Just imagine Netanyahu or any of the cherished leaders
accomplishing a fraction of that during their first year in office. What kind
of gods, the author of the article and those of his ilk would have called them?
If you want to know why he believes that Sisi's efforts will
not work, he tells you why. He says that Sisi is paranoid, and the proof is
that the government has banned the soccer fan clubs of hooligans known as the
Ultras. This pattern, he goes on to say, will frighten Egyptians into silence
... contrary to what they did twice before when millions of them marched in the
streets unafraid, to demand the removal of Mubarak and then Morsi. But – and
there is a but as always in this kind of articles: “But there's no evidence to
suggest that in a crisis, Egypt 's
generals would protect Sisi.” He does not say protect the President from whom
or from what if the people will be so afraid they will keep quiet.
Now you want to know what kind of crisis he is talking about
to begin with. And he opines (actually wishes openly): “An economic collapse or
a widespread popular uprising.” How will this happen? “corruption,
unaccountability, and serial failures to accomplish the basic bread-and-butter
business of the state,” he answers. This incompetence will negatively affect
the war on terror upon which Sisi is building his legitimacy, he goes on to
say. And the net result will be that the insurgency will continue to
destabilize the country, he openly wishes.
And that's not all because Egypt also has an untenable national
balance sheet, unacceptable levels of subsidies, growing unemployment and
inadequate water for agriculture under current usage practices, he prays openly
to the gods of his superstition.