The astounding thing is not that Egypt got itself an elected
president but that the pundits in America fail to either stress the most
salient points, or they keep falling into the trap of harking back to the old
and tired stereotypes only to rehash the old and tired arguments. You can see
this trend on the op-ed page of the June 26, 2012 edition of the Wall Street
Journal where two articles are published on the subject. The first is titled:
“What to expect From the Muslim Brotherhood” and subtitled: “Egyptians deserve
a decent interval before Western observers consign them again to a despotic
fate,” written by Fouad Ajami. The second is a column titled: “Who Lost Egypt?”
and subtitled: “Egyptians, obviously. Obama and Bush, too. And a superficial
idea of 'freedom,'” written by Bret Stephens.
Only a few months ago Ajami had written an article in which
he mentioned that Egypt
used to have a vibrant democracy lasting a number of decades till the coup that
overthrew the monarchy in 1952. He seems to have wanted to begin the current
article by reminding us of this reality, but then pulled back and went around
the historical fact. The reason for the shyness is not surprising; it is that
when the people of Egypt
cast their ballots this time, a pundit or two in North American began by saying
that Egypt
had returned to the time when it used to have a democratic system of
government; but then something flipped. A reversal happened when one pundit
said that Egypt
had gone to the ballot box for the first time in its five thousand year
history, and everyone after him echoed that same piece of journalistic rubbish.
It soon became the dogma that no one dared to contradict.
This turn of the events must have affected Ajami's
willingness to buck the trend, but he could not hide his original intention.
For proof of this, look how he ends the article: “Many … forget or ignore even
recent history, how the Egyptian people had abandoned politics...” Well, when
you abandon something it means that you had it previously. And so you ask: When
was that? But there is nothing in the body of the article that would answer the
question. Instead you have the start of the article which goes this way:
“Egyptian history can be said to have closed a circle.” Well, here again, when
you close a circle, you make the end join the beginning. If the end (today) is
a democracy that has joined the beginning (six decades ago) it means that the
country was having a democracy at that time as much as it is having it at this
time. But the author held back on that so as not to go against the flow.
When you do this, you inevitably hark back to the old
stereotypes. Thus, instead of drawing the parallels between the pre-1952 period
and today to give us an idea what we should expect will happen from here on,
Ajami repeats the following old and tired refrain: “...a state … its sly
leaders understood the limitations imposed by the poverty of Egypt, its need
for the kindness of strangers, reliance on foreign aid and the revenues of tourism.”
This is to say that the Egyptian economy is a shambles like the echo repeaters
have been repeating all along without explaining how or why that is.
But the surprising thing is that instead of encountering an
echo of this kind in the Bret Stephens article -- which on the whole relies
more on the old stereotypes -- you encounter a more enlightened treatment of
this subject. Here is what Stephens says: “The Egyptian economy is in enough
distress that the new government could be pliant. But that window won't be open
for very long, and the effects of such pressure aren't likely to be
long-lived.” What this means is that he is aware the Egyptian economy has such
rock solid fundamentals, even a revolution that lasted a year and a half could
not shake it enough to make a dent in it. And the moment that the nation will
get back on its feet, the economic eagle will fly again in the Egyptian sky.
Undoubtedly, this is what is being whispered at this time in the corridors of
the Wall Street Journal.
Thus, you can say that choosing the path of stereotype
instead of writing an article paralleling the old democracy in Egypt
with what the new democracy may come to look like in the country, Ajami missed
an opportunity to write a remarkable article that would have been a memorable
one for a long time to come. And this is the most regrettable part of that
whole exercise because the author could have changed the tenor of the
discussion throughout the marketplace of ideas from what it is now to what
could have resembled what is being whispered so quietly in the corridors of the
Wall Street Journal.
We now look at the rest of the Stephens article. He begins
it with the assertion: “Egypt
is lost.” To expand on this, he does something that is absolutely typical of
modern day Jewish writing in that he goes through a mountain of historical
events, grabs a handful of pebbles and compares them with what is happening
now. Thus, he warns that we must not console ourselves because: “Iran and Turkey show how easily the
conscripts can be bought, the noncoms wooed and the officers purged.” And
because of this: “The Brotherhood is … politically skillful, economically
literate and strategically patient.” And this too: “Any party that rules street
and square makes its own 'democratic' rules.” And finally this: “By degrees,
Egypt will … arm Hamas as remilitarize the Sinai … extract concessions from the
U.S. … make radical alliances.”
So now he asks the absurd question: “Who lost Egypt ?” and he
goes around looking for culprits, naming a few of them. The first that he names
are the Egyptian people who voted the way they did. The second is the Obama
administration because Hillary Clinton said this: “Our assessment is that the
Egyptian government is stable.” Yes it is Bret; the fact is that power was
transferred from Mubarak to the military, and will soon be transferred to the
Morsi administration without wrecking the country. This is stability because,
despite all that has befallen the country, people did not seek to exit the
country the way they did in Iraq ,
Libya or Syria . And the
world noticed this, the reason why the Egyptian currency did not move as much
as the Euro did, for example. Just imagine what would have happened to the
Greek or the Spanish currency if these countries still had their own. Their
demise would have been a powerful sign of instability.
Thus, we can only conclude that Bret Stephens has memorized
what is being whispered in the corridors of the Wall Street Journal with regard
to the Egyptian economy but has not fully understood the lesson. Another thing
he does not understand is the mood of the people in the region, be they
Egyptian or any other Arab. Look what he says: “...just 19% of Egyptians
approve of Mr. Obama's leadership, according to Gallup . So much for the Cairo Speech.” Hey Bret, the preoccupation
with Obama's leadership is an American preoccupation. Don't go hide behind the
Arabs to grind your private domestic ax. What the Arabs took from the Obama
speech in Cairo was the promise that he was
going to be even-handed with regards to the question of Palestine . But when he vetoed the Palestinian
request for membership in the UN, his popularity plummeted. And this has
nothing to do with the man's ability to lead America .
He also names the Bush administration. He says that because
the American ambassador in Cairo said there was
freedom of speech in Egypt
at a time when the administration was committed to a freedom agenda, the Bush
team participated in the loss of Egypt . He does not explain how or
why this is so but he asks a number of questions then says this: “The questions
are self-answering.” No, they are not. In fact, they are totally ridiculous,
and if he believes that nations can be swayed with a few words uttered by an America
president, I have a bridge to sell this guy. Wanna buy the Brooklyn Bridge
Lastly, he blames the Egyptian liberal abdicators. What this
means is that he would have liked to see the confrontation in Egypt continue till it resembled what he sees in
Syria
at this time, a horror story where ten to fifteen thousand people have
died already and thousands more rendered
homeless. With Egypt's population being four times the size of Syria's, he
would have loved to see fifty to sixty thousand dead Egyptians and hundreds of
thousands of refugees – which would have fulfilled the still unfulfilled
ancient Jewish vision of a Nile flowing like a river of blood.
Instead of seeing this, he expects to see this: “So prepare
for an Egypt that likes us
about as much as Nasser 's did … It's going to
be a long and ugly haul.” To him and
apparently to all Jews, a Nile in Egypt that looks like a river of
blood is a prettier sight than whatever.
We hear you, Bret,
we hear you loud and clear.