Surprise! Someone at Hudson makes Sense

Fellows at the Hudson Institute are notorious for being wrong a hundred percent of the time when discussing political or religious subjects.

Thus, it came as a pleasant surprise that a fellow at the Hudson wrote an article which makes sense. The subject matter that's tackled is neither political nor religious, however, but is a scientific summation of the existing defense capabilities against a missile attack.

The writer is Arthur Herman who wrote: “Boost-Phase Intercept Is Still the Best Defense against the North Korean Nuclear Threat,” an article that was published on June 15, 2017 in National Review Online. The writer's focus is the situation in the Eastern Pacific. I am not adding or subtracting a thing to what he says. I'm simply highlighting the scientific facts he brought to light, and applying them to a couple of other regions on the globe. These would be Europe and the Middle East. What follows is a compilation of the pertinent passages in the Arthur Herman article:

“Effective ballistic-missile defense is a boost-phase-intercept (BPI) system using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) equipped with conventional interceptor missiles. Anti-missile systems such as THAAD, AEGIS, and Patriot only shoot down a missile as it re-enters the atmosphere. Destroying the missile in its earlier, 'boost' phase halts it during the slowest, hottest phase of its launch. Our Agency is working on a BPI system using UAVs equipped with high-energy lasers, but the lasers don't yet exist. A (BPI) system located outside North Korea would not protect South Korea against a missile fired at Seoul, but it could prevent a launch on Japan or the U.S.”

To appreciate what's involved in intercepting and destroying an incoming missile, it is necessary to understand the stages through which the missile goes before reaching its destination. From rest, a missile that's fired begins to ascend at a low speed, but then accelerates at a rapid rate for a few minutes. Depending on how far it is destined to go, its average cruising speed will reach anywhere between half a mile a second and three miles.

The early period, called the boost phase, is when the missile uses a great deal of fuel; and this makes it easy to detect with heat sensors stationed even hundreds of miles away. It is also the point at which the missile – most likely using liquid fuel – travels at its slowest speed. It is therefore the easiest time to chase after it, intercept it and blow it up with a faster traveling rocket that uses quick-starting solid fuel.

The question, therefore, is this: Where is the best place to station your intercept rocket? And the answer is: As near as possible to the missile's base. But there is a caveat. If the missile is aimed at you, the chances are very low that you'll intercept it before it destroys your station … whether or not you have completed the launch. That's because, to hit an incoming missile, you must intercept it head-on, a difficult thing to do. And here is why:

Suppose a missile is launched from North Korea, and determined to be heading toward California. It happens that intercept rockets are stationed in Hawaii. Is it better to launch a rocket westward trying to intercept the Korean missile head-on? Or is it better to wait till the missile has come almost above Hawaii, and launch the intercept rocket to go in the same eastward direction as the missile, accost it to almost touch it, and blow up, thus destroy it while traveling at the same speed?

You can see that the second proposition is the best because two vehicles approaching each other at more than 30,000 feet a second are more difficult to intercept than hitting a bullet head-on with another bullet.

When you understand all that, it'll be easy to see why the Eastern Europeans would be unhappy to have American interceptors stationed on their soil to defend against presumed Iranian missiles. The truth is that the interceptors will defend Western Europe but not those hosting them. Worse, they will invite the Iranians to hit them first and take them out before launching a follow-up volley toward Western Europe.

As to the Middle East, it is easy to see that the only way to defend Israel against a missile attack is to station land based interceptors as far away as Iraq and Saudi Arabia, or station them at sea in the Persian Gulf, which is what the Israelis hope the American navy will do for them. Thus, any talk about the existence of a system – such as the fictitious Iron Dome – defending Israel, is a big lie that serves to siphon off money from America.