Tuesday, June 20, 2017

Wasting 7 trillion worse than wasted 6 trillion

Before and after his election, President Donald Trump kept reminding the public that presidents who occupied the White House before him wasted 6 trillion dollars in the Middle East and got nothing in return for America or anyone else for that matter. This was a wise thing for him to have said because it was true.

During the presidential campaign, Donald Trump also promised that if elected, he'll see to it that the terrorists are rendered ineffective, thus free the world from their nefarious activities. And this was the honorable thing for him to have said regardless as to its feasibility.

The trouble, however, is that both the reminder and the promise have now clashed. It happened because the President is trying to be truthful to both sayings at the same time. The news is that he is sending more troops to Afghanistan to finish off the terrorists, which is what other presidents did before him, and wasted 6 trillion dollars, like he says, with nothing to show for their effort. They got nothing in return for America, according him, and there is no reason to believe he'll do better.

That situation, therefore, begs the question: When will President Donald Trump realize that the war in Afghanistan is a lost cause? Will it be after he spends another trillion dollars fighting it? Or will it be after he spends 6 trillion more dollars?

Two authors took up that subject, and did an excellent job parsing it for the readers who want to know the unbiased, unvarnished truth of what's involved in the Afghan operation. They are A. Trevor Thrall and Erik Goepner. They wrote: “Trump's massive Afghanistan mistake,” an article that was published on June 18, 2017 in the New York Daily News.

The authors begin with the premise that the Trump administration wants to terminate the existential threat that's menacing the Afghan government. And so, they remind the readers that the United States has been trying to do just that for 16 years, and made little or no progress. Thus, they offer the opinion that this is a bad thing to try again. They go on to say, it is even worse to contemplate sending more troops to do the same old thing under the same old strategy.

Trevor and Goepner say that the people who advocate sending more troops to Afghanistan advance two arguments to make their point. They claim that fighting the terrorists in Afghanistan prevents the latter from committing terror in America. They also claim that sending more troops to Afghanistan will prevent the Taliban from ending the country's experiment with democracy. And so, they set out to debunk both claims.

They say that Al Qaeda has been weakened so badly in Afghanistan, that country represents little threat of terrorism. In fact, Al Qaeda and its offshoots have gone to other places around the globe, they assert, and if America wants to continue fighting them, it should do so where it can find them.

As to the desire of shoring up the democratic experiment in Afghanistan, the writers inform the readers that in the long run, America will not be able to control that country's political outcomes; the effort will come to naught. This is so true, in fact, it can be attested to by anyone that tried to guarantee the outcome of an election.

At this point, the writers resurrect a bitter truism; one that was learned during the Vietnam War. They adapted it to the current situation like this: “Eventually, the U.S. will leave. The Taliban will not.” And they lament that the Taliban now control more territory than they ever did since 2001. All this, they say, despite the large number of deaths that occurred during that period of time, including 3,500 civilians in 2016 alone.

They end their presentation by revealing something that's as poignant as it is tragic. Here it is in their own words: “The honest reason for America's enduring military commitment is that no President wants to be the one who 'lost Afghanistan' … W. Bush and Obama maintained just enough of a military and rhetorical commitment to avoid getting blamed for losing the war”.

And they conclude that President Trump inherited a war he never liked; a conundrum that forces him to choose between keeping his promise at the risk of losing the war, or going against his grain while expending more lives and more treasure by emulating two predecessors he endlessly criticized. How much worse can it get!

But why not reject the second choice out of hand, and put the whole thing behind him?

Well, Trevor and Goepner have a theory about that. They hint that President Trump finds himself in a no-win situation but has a third alternative. This is why they believe he “gave Mattis the authority to handle the Afghan strategy from the Pentagon. That way, when things go south, Trump will have someone to blame.” Wow!

Does Mattis know any of this? Should someone whisper it in his ear?