When it comes to understanding how culture affects our
vision of the world, things cannot get any better than what happened during the
past week or so. The New York Times published two articles on the same subject,
one written by Vali R. Nasr who is an American of Iranian descent; the other by
Thomas L. Friedman who is an American Jew. Nasr wrote: “America Mustn't Be Naïve About Iran ” and had it published on
October 2, 2013. Friedman wrote: “A Wolf, a Sheep, or What?” and had it
published on October 5, 2013. Both discuss the subject of Iran and its place in
the grand scheme of things.
When you read the two articles and take a moment to reflect
on them, you cannot help but see the situation as a metaphor, something that Friedman
starts his article with. The exception is that the metaphor you come up with
will be different from what Friedman has in mind. Yours will be to the effect
that Nasr is standing and looking down at a map of the World, focusing his
vision on the Middle East and trying to assess a geopolitical dimension that is
fast evolving. In contrast Friedman is laid back looking at the clouds and
trying to make out if what he sees looks like a wolf or a sheep.
Nasr is an empiricist who formulates hypotheses and draws
conclusions based on what he observes in real life. Where he sees movement in
any of the parts, he formulates a tentative opinion as to where those parts
will be in the foreseeable future. In contrast, Friedman is looking at a sky
where the clouds could be moving and changing shape but he fails to see any of
that. Instead, he has come with a static picture in his head about the cloud
being a wolf or a sheep, so he tries to settle in his mind whether it is one or
the other.
Knowing what it is that he looks at, and knowing that
America is full of people who think like Friedman and make decisions based on a
stereotypical vision that is static and that is false, Nasr constructs the
thesis that is reflected in the title of his article, and so he warns: America
mustn't be naïve about Iran. He is here telling the American negotiators who
will soon be sitting with their Iranian counterparts to negotiate a range of
issues, that they must not make the mistake of believing Iran is negotiating
from a position of weakness.
This leads him to assert that “Iran's diplomatic flexibility
should not be mistaken for willingness to surrender. Iran does not see itself as
vanquished. Its political system is still the most resilient in the region. It
is reveling in a newfound stability.” This being a wide view of how Iran sees
itself, the nuclear issue is not even mentioned in passing. Nasr does not see
an Iranian leadership that is separate from the population; he sees an Iran
that is made of a people and a government, both of which want the same thing
for the country in the long run.
Contrast this with the narrow view that is focused on the
nuclear issue which Friedman is offering: “North Korea built a nuclear arsenal
to protect that regime from threats, It's a foxy survival strategy: a nuclear
iron fist that keeps the world at bay and its people isolated and weak … Iran's
leadership also sees a nuclear weapon as potential insurance against regime
change … But Iran is not North Korea. It can't keep its people isolated indefinitely.
In theory, Iran's regime does not have to keep the world out and its people
down for Iran to be powerful. But do Iran's leaders accept that theory?”
Nasr dismisses the potential regional rivalries as
inconsequential to Iran's evolution for the time being, and asserts that
“Iran's main nemesis remains the United States.” And so, to end his
presentation, he cautions that “as America approaches talks with Iran, it must
not assume that Iran is ready to surrender … Negotiations cannot be based on
threatening Iran into submission, but on persuading it to compromise.” As you
can see, there is nothing here about a preconceived vision as to what Iran
should look like at the end of the process. What the author is saying in effect
is this: Let the negotiations begin, and let the natural process take its
course.
In sharp contrast to all that, you have what Friedman is
offering. He begins this part of his presentation with a quote from Col. Mark
Mykleby who admitted: “We've been trying hard to use control dynamics to
contain Iran that we've lost sight of the fact...” He then quotes the
Iranian-American Abdel Nader Mousacizadeh who said: “If we are sufficiently
disabused of our ability to remake countries in our own image, we begin to see
Iran as the potential China of the Middle East.”
And so, you may think that Friedman would be inclined to end
the presentation with something that approaches what Vali Nasr has come up
with. But no, that's not what he says. In fact, he continues to see the world
in terms of good guys wearing the white hat, and bad guys wearing the black
hat. Here is what he says: “China's leaders are not Boy Scouts either. I remain
a skeptic that Iran's regime can generate the consensus to make a similar
transition. Secretary of State Kerry has the right attitude: No lifting of
sanctions for anything less than the airtight closure to any possible
weaponization of Iran's nuclear program.” You accept this as being his opinion,
and you're willing to leave it at that.
But that's not where he leaves it. Instead, he goes on to
say: “That's the only deal worth having, and the only way Iran will decide if
it really is a China in Persian clothing.” That is, he still believes that if Iran
does not do as told, it will only become what it is allowed to become regardless
of what transpires at the negotiating table.
This shows that Thomas Friedman has learned nothing from the
two gentlemen he quoted.
He is who he is because how you see the world determines who
and what you are.