A popular saying warns that those who do not learn from history are bound to repeat it. Fair enough. But which history and what lessons are we to learn?
There are two
problems here. First, history is never complete. It is therefore constantly
revised when new facts come to light. As well, two historians looking at the
same set of facts will have different explanations for what they see. How do we
decide which opinion to take and which to ignore? Second, when we look at
historical events, we look at a time and circumstances that were so different
from the present, the lessons we learn about the past, may not adapt adequately
enough to be our guide as we go through the current circumstances.
Peter Huessy has
attempted to overcome these difficulties, writing an article under the title:
“Arms Control Plus: What Reagan Got Right About Nuclear Deterrence,” which also
came under the subtitle: “The nuclear challenges the United States faces today
are every bit as daunting as they were in 1985, but there may indeed be lessons
from Reagan’s Cold War experience that can adequately address them.” The
article was published on January 16, 2022 in the National Interest.
The first thing we
notice when reading the article is that arms control was shaped the way that it
was, not so much as a result of the give-and-take that was supposed to take
place between the two superpowers, as it was by their internal politics. In
fact, Peter Huessy tells of how infrequent were the encounters between the
American and Soviet negotiators. He also gives a detailed account of what went
on in Washington that frustrated Reagan so much, he changed his plans on some
things, and did other things in secret. In addition, from the few signs that
came out of Moscow, the guess is that political upheaval went on there too.
Because these
realities attest to the banality of the process that gave the world ‘arms
control’ during the Reagan era, Peter Huessy was forced to give that process an
importance it does not deserve. However, as you’ll see, what he did, is so laughable,
it cannot be taken seriously that he really means what he says. See for
yourself; here is what he wrote:
“During the 1970’s era of detente and peaceful coexistence, when the
USSR thought it had nuclear superiority and believed that the ‘correlation of forces’
favored Moscow, more than one dozen countries fell into the Soviet
orbit—including Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. With the liberation of Grenada
under the Reagan administration, it was the first time since 1917 that some
portion of Soviet territory was liberated from the Soviet empire. Today, there
is again concern that, as US conventional legacy forces decline over the next
decade as part of an effort to save resources for military modernization, a
nuclear window of vulnerability may open vis-à-vis China and Russia. Reagan’s
1985-86 approach to the strategic balance may be a good reference point for how
US policymakers should act today. This mixture of policies found success before
and may do so again”.
Without coming
right out and saying it clearly, Peter Huessy is using his writing skills to
establish a cause-and-effect relationship that does not exist in reality. Just
think about it, he says that when for a brief moment it was thought that the
Soviet Union had a nuclear advantage over America, the masses in more than a
dozen countries — including
Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan — staged revolutions. They brought down their
governments and went into the
Soviet orbit. But when Reagan sent the US military to quell a popular
disturbance in the tiny island of Grenada, the move caused it to drop out of
the Soviet orbit.
To build on that
fantasy, Huessy went on to say that there is a lesson to be learned from this
Reagan experience that would apply to the current situation. He explains that a
nuclear window of vulnerability is opening with regard to China and Russia. His
subtle message is that it is better to invade countries (perhaps in Latin
America) when they begin to show local disturbances, than let those
disturbances develop into full blown revolutions that will send those countries
into the China-Russia orbit.
So, now we ask:
What do we know about the current situation that may resemble the past to such
an extent, we should let the past guide us into the future?
What we know about
the current situation is that we can divide the world into two categories: The
have and the have-not.
The have are mostly
European and North American countries, as well a few in Asia. They are
satisfied with their current condition, and still look forward to better days
ahead. To get there, they want assurances of security but without getting into
hardcore alliances that may get them into unforeseen trouble.
As to the have not,
they still have the means to find out what goes on around the globe. They know
how the people in the developed nations live, and want to be like them. They
don’t care what ideology will get them there, and they demand that their
governments do what’s necessary to raise their standard of living one way or
the other.
Against this
backdrop, we have America which is a superpower that is in relative decline,
and wants to maintain the status quo to mitigate its own decline. We also have
an alliance between China and Russia, which are rising superpowers whose rise
is causing America’s decline — now
measured in relative terms, but promising to be in absolute terms if the trend
is not halted.
Russia has an issue
with Ukraine, it wants to settle diplomatically if possible or by war if
necessary. China has an issue with Taiwan, it wants to settle diplomatically if
possible or by war if necessary. What the two superpowers want is what America
wants to prevent. To succeed in realizing what it’s doing, America is seeking
allies around the world. The Europeans who were allied with America and remain
tied to it via the NATO alliance, are not happy with America’s hawkish stance. As
to the have-not nations, they hear and read what America’s opinion makers say
about doing to other countries what will serve America’s interests, regardless
as to how it might affect the host countries, and they want none of that.
Deserted by
everybody, America knows that no configuration of its nuclear forces will deter
China or Russia from doing what they want.