It happens to all of us as individuals or a family, as a community or a nation. It happens that we suffer a tragedy and we pull back to mourn in solitude. We think about what happened, on where we stand now, how we may cope with the loss, and how we may carry on in the days ahead.
But then what? What after the period of
mourning? The answer is that we should take advantage of being emotionally
exhausted, and surrender to reason the will to plan and act in the future. It
becomes crucial to do so especially if we know that the tragedy was something
we could have avoided but we did not.
Reflecting on how we conducted ourselves
during the period that preceded the tragedy, we realize that despite all the
talk about being individualistic to the core, much of our behavior was
generated in response to external stimuli that left us with few choices to act
differently. And so, the questions to ask are these: What did we neglect over
the years that got us to this point in the first place? How did it happen that
we found ourselves cornered in a tight spot with unsavory options to choose
from?
And this is when a French proverb comes to
mind. It goes like this: “Dis moi qui tu hantes, je dirai qui tu es,” which
translates as: “Tell me who you haunt, I’ll tell who you are.” It has an
English equivalent that goes like this: “A man is known by the company he keeps.”
Because this discussion deals with international relations, the word “haunt” is
used to denote the people who are hired to advise the government, and not those
you hang out with socially.
In fact, the point of this discussion is to
demonstrate that the condition in which America finds itself at this point in
time, relates to the kind of people that the government has been hiring to
advise it. One of these people has been John R. Bolton who wrote a recent
article that came under the title: “The time for equivocating about a
nuclear-armed, Taliban-friendly Pakistan is over,” published on August 23, 2021
in The Washington Post.
What Bolton’s article demonstrates, is where
he starts when he thinks about formulating a policy towards a foreign nation.
In this essay, he speaks of “Taliban-friendly Pakistan” in the abstract, but
this is how he also thinks when in office carrying on the business of the
nation. In fact, the reason why even the unstable man that used to be his boss,
could not tolerate his careless behavior and fired him, is that John Bolton
publicly telegraphed to North Korea, his desire to treat it the way that America
treated Libya’s leaders. Needless to say that in so doing, Bolton sabotaged
what progress America had achieved in winning the confidence of the North Korean
leaders.
The following is a condensed version of what
he says he wants to see done to Pakistan and the Taliban:
“Prime Minister Imran Khan is essentially
just another pretty face. The prospect that Pakistan could slip warheads to
terrorist groups would make a new 9/11 more deadly. These dangers provided
compelling reasons to sustain the US military presence in Afghanistan. We could
have continued to observe what was happening in Pakistan and Iran. The United
States must now come down hard on Islamabad if it continues supporting the
Taliban. The United States should eliminate its aid to Islamabad; impose
anti-terrorist sanctions; and more. If a future terrorist regime in Islamabad
appears ready to transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, we should take
preventive action. Beijing’s long-standing assistance to Islamabad’s nuclear
efforts makes China responsible for any misuse. Is President Biden sufficiently
resolute to do the necessary? Probably not”.
Now imagine John Bolton being a National
Security advisor to the President of the United States, and he lets his views,
as toxic as they are, be known to the world. What do you think the Pakistani
leaders will think and do in response to this kind of juvenile behavior? And
what kind of relationship will ensue between Washington and Islamabad as a
result?
To put these ideas in perspective, we compare
Bolton’s performance against that of someone who is levelheaded. He is Daniel
R. DePetris who wrote a recent article under the title: “What the Collapse of
Afghanistan Means for America’s Future,” and the subtitle: “This past-action
theory of credibility has proven to be a bogus, in large part because no two
situations or crises are identical—and no two US presidents are identical
either.” It was published on August 23, 2021 in The National Interest.
The following is how Daniel DePetris begins
his discussion:
“In the midst of the finger-pointing about who
is ultimately responsible for Afghanistan’s collapse, arguments used by
critics of the withdrawal are receiving a pass. They generally center on three,
wobbly legs: (1) withdrawal will damage Washington’s credibility with allies
and adversaries alike; (2) provide China with a golden opportunity to expand
its influence in South and Central Asia at the expense of the United
States and (3) throw Afghanistan back into the arms of anti-US terrorist
groups. There are significant problems with all of them”.
And so, DePetris responded as follows to the
arguments used by critics of the withdrawal:
First,
the logic underlying the credibility thesis will force US allies to question
Washington’s commitment and reputation. Recent history, however, has
demonstrated how empty the credibility argument truly is. Other countries
don’t judge the US on past actions. This theory has proven to be bogus because
no two situations or crises are identical—and no two US presidents are
identical either.
Second,
for China to follow in Washington's footsteps in Afghanistan and make the same
mistakes would be an error in judgment. The Chinese Communist Party isn’t
stupid. Yes, Afghanistan possesses as much as $1 trillion in mineral wealth.
But other foreign powers, as well as China itself, have sought to extract those
resources and have failed time and time again, running up against insecurity
and byzantine bureaucracy. China’s interest in Afghanistan right now is:
ensuring the country’s disorder doesn’t spread across its borders.
Third:
Concerns about terrorism emanating from Afghanistan are overblown. For one, the
US intelligence community has made remarkable improvements since 9/11 in
utilizing the technology to find, track, and neutralize terrorists regardless
of where they may set up shop. there is no such thing as a safe haven for
them anymore. Could the Taliban and Al Qaeda strengthen their relationship
after a US withdrawal? It’s plausible. However, the Taliban have a
self-interest in reigning in Al Qaeda and limiting operations against the
United States, assuming the group wants to govern Afghanistan for more than a
few months.
Compare this DePetris performance against that of Bolton, and you’ll know why you’d want to see the State Department haunt Daniel DePetris to advise it rather than John Bolton.