Sunday, October 11, 2015

Stuck between Nostalgia and Realism

Here is a question that is relevant to our times: Where does America stand today? And here is an answer that is as good as any: America is stuck somewhere between nostalgia and realism.

Two articles, each defining one of those positions, make up a picture describing a nation that has come to the crossroads of its journey from a rocky start to a glorious present to one that contemplates a future that can be of decline or a steady-state average kind of existence.

The article exuding realism came under the title: “How America can counter Putin's moves in Syria,” co-authored by Condoleezza Rice and Robert M. Gates, and published on October 8, 2015 in the Washington Post. The one that expresses nostalgia came under the title: “How to Confront Vladimir Putin,” written by Matthew Continetti, and published on October 10, 2015 in National Review Online.

Rice who was Secretary of State in a previous incarnation, and Gates who was Secretary of Defense in a previous incarnation, have no illusions as to what can be done in the face of moves that were taken by Russia's Vladimir Putin in response to a serious situation that is developing in the Middle East. They understand the Russian thinking with some clarity, but they make the classic mistake of sizing-up Russia's economy based on what the quack economists pour into the public square.

They say that in two crucial areas, Putin defines the things he wants to do in a way that is different from the way the Americans define those things. One is the concept of stability; the other is the idea of success. To Putin, stability does not mean a foreign state that is not failing, according to our two writers. If this happens and “if Moscow's people can govern only a part but make it impossible for anyone to govern the rest – so be it,” they explain. As to success, they contend that Putin does not take into account “the dismal situation of the [civilian population].” He will do what is good for Russia regardless of the consequences, which is why he can “play a weak hand extraordinarily well,” they advise.

So they ask: “What can we do?” And they list four things that America can do. Two of those (the first and the forth on the list) concern the way that America must change its perception of reality and its attitude toward the daily events as they develop. Here is the first point: “We must reject the argument that Putin is simply reacting to world disorder.” And here is the fourth: “We need to see Putin for who he is. Stop saying that we want to better understand Russian motives.”

As to the second and third points, the two authors say that America must create facts on the ground such as no-fly zones and safe harbors for the refugees. It can also provide support for the Kurdish forces, the Sunni tribes and what's left of the Iraqi special forces. But they also say that America must “de-conflict” its military activities with those of the Russians. How these two objectives can be attained simultaneously remains a mystery. Oh well, maybe the generals on both sides can figure something out if and when they sit together and talk.

We now come to the Matthew Continetti article. Before we take a closer look at it, we should recall a passage that came in the Rice and Gates article while bearing in mind that they are two veterans of America's national security apparatus. We need to do this because Continetti gets into this area of discussion, and he is no expert on matters of national security.

Here is the relevant passage in the Rice and Gates article: “Hectoring Putin about the bad choices he has made sounds weak. The last time the Russians regretted a foreign adventure was Afghanistan. But that didn't happen until Reagan armed the mujahideen … an exhausted Soviet Union decided that the Afghan adventure wasn't worth it.” Nowhere in the article do they suggest that the Reagan approach can be repeated and be successful.

But that's not what Matthew Continetti is advising. Mentioning Reagan 23 times in his article, he begins to explain his ideas like this: “To create a freer and richer world, Russia must be knocked on its heels. That's what Reagan did. What is required is a Reagan Doctrine for the 21st century – a military, diplomatic, and cultural approach that elevates America's stature and diminishes Russia's.”

And the young writer offers not a single suggestion as to how this can be done in the new era, which leaves the reader with the impression he means to say there is a magic wand that can be waved and make things happen the way they do in the land of juvenile fantasy.

Why did Rice and Gates not say so two days earlier when they wrote their piece? Because they are the adults that had extensive experience in such matters. They know that what worked in one place at one time will not necessarily work in another place at another time. They too might have felt nostalgic about the good old days when they were young, but the passage of time has taught them that nostalgia and reality rarely agree. Young Matthew will someday grow up too and see things differently – perhaps.

For now, let it be known that when the choice comes down to having it one way or the other, it is better to be a realist than be a nostalgic fool.