Wednesday, January 15, 2020

A Deterrent that's used often is no Deterrent

Ever since the beginning of time, people who built something worth having and were subjected to marauders who coveted what they had, and attacked them to steal it –– the builders thought of ways and means to scare and deter the marauders from coming too close.

And there lies a long story because a deterrent that does what it's supposed to do, is a complex set of approaches invoked to ascertain self-defense. And even then, a deterrent can only be a temporary stopgap that will protect its user for a finite period of time, after which it will be rendered ineffective.

From the passive wall of China that was supposed to keep marauders out, to the fierce looking statues of Egypt that signaled to potential marauders the country had the strength of crush them, to the Roman outposts at the periphery of the empire that served as a first line of defense, nothing proved good enough to save those empires from attacks and eventual defeat.

In the modern era, nations that feared being invaded by someone, have conducted maneuvers to show off the kind of weaponry they had with which they will “aggressively” defend themselves. Other nations relied on putting out rumors to the effect that they developed secret weapons so powerful, they will obliterate any invader who will dare to attack them.

And then, as usual, the Israelis came up with cockamamie ideas that were invented more to impress their worldwide rank-and-file than to scare a potential foe. They did three things: (1) They put out unconvincing rumors that they had an arsenal of nuclear weapons. (2) They pretended to have initiated a never-ending stream of restoring deterrence with Iran and its proxies. But because these activities proved to have been a laughable joke, the Israelis resorted to the third thing: (3) They called on the Americans to come and do what's necessary to prevent Israel's anticipated defeat.

The sad part is that instead of learning from this experience the reality that quackery does not work well when it comes to matters of war and peace, the Americans emulated the Israelis, thus made their approach to defense, a laughable joke similar to that of Israel. You can see it for yourself when you go over the article that came under the title: “Trump restores deterrence with Iran,” written by Matt Nackowiak, and published on January 8, 2020 in The Washington Times.

Talking about the assassination of the Iranian general Qassem Soleimani, Matt Nackowiak said this: “Perhaps more importantly, Mr. Trump has restored deterrence with Iran.” What's that about? Well, long ago, America had a program to assassinate foreign leaders, especially in Latin America, such as the many attempts they mounted to get rid of Cuba's Fidel Castro. But the Americans did so clandestinely because they wanted to retain the luxury of denying what they were doing.

Because this proved to be a bad idea, the Americans were eventually forbidden from doing it by the Church Commission. For the Trump Administration to come now, revive the practice and brag about it as having “restored deterrence with Iran” is to imitate the Israelis that got into the business of assassination ever since they came into existence. Later in life, the Israelis also got into the business of restoring deterrence –– which they did thousands of times with enemies that absorbed their blows and kept coming back at them. In fact, Israel has attained the limit of its deterrence so definitely, it is the one that's now being deterred by the very tiny but very capable Hezbollah: Lebanon's Defense Force (LDF).

So then, what is there to learn about the business of deterrence? It is that if you have the means to inflict severe damage on a potential foe, and he doesn't know it, you show him what you can do by conducting military maneuvers or by exploding a super-bomb in the desert, for example. If the foe is still not convinced, and he conducts an operation against you, that's when you do to him what the lesson has not taught him.

This is what may be called effective deterrence. But to do what the Israelis do, which is to assassinate Palestinians they fantasize are dangerous to Israel, or conduct “thousands” of raids against targets in Syria, and think of each as having deterred the Syrians or the Iranians and their proxies, is to engage in self-deception, as well as deceiving the rank-and-file that's supporting Israel.

In fact, self-deception is a state of mind that the Israelis can engage in because they know that in the end, when they will have cornered themselves and saw no way out, they can call on the Americans to come and rescue them. But who will the Americans call on when they realize that assassinating an Iranian general has not deterred the Iranians? And realize that they cornered themselves and see no way out?