Saturday, January 25, 2014

Numerology + Comparison = Superstition

Finally, an American Jew has brought the two legs of Jewish superstition in one place to discuss them simultaneously. They are Numerology and Comparison; the two legs upon which stand the vaunted Jewish wisdom. The Jew is Tom Friedman, and the article he wrote was published in the New York Times on January 26, 2014 under the title: 1; 5,000; 500,000

While these are three numbers, the author assures the reader at the start that together, they only form one of three questions he will tackle to eliminate any confusion the reader may have about what he calls “all the turmoil in the Arab world.” The other two questions have to do with Tunisia where the US has had the least involvement but where the most progress was made; and Egypt where General Sisi has so many medals on his chest, the reader should worry, says he. Tunisia and Egypt; that's where the comparison is attempted.

To elaborate on the Tunisian situation, Friedman relies on an opinion expressed by none other than the New York Times which, writing about the newly forged Tunisian Constitution, said that it “is a carefully worded blend of ideas that has won the support of both the Islamist party and the secular opposition.” He praises the concoction for being the most liberal in the Arab world but then cautions that “the whole thing could still blow up at any time.” So much for Jewish superstition. But he is not ready to give up yet, so he says that's still an achievement, then asks: What's the secret?

He answers that question in two parts, the first being his own idea; the second being that of someone else. His idea is that the main forces in Tunisia seem to have come together and have accepted the principle that power will be shared and rotated. The second idea is that of Craig Charney who is a pollster in South Africa and the Middle East, says Friedman. And Charney points out that Tunisia already had strong civil society institutions that played a moderating role between the various factions, which is different from the situation in Egypt where the military stands as the strongest institution.

Wow! How magnificent, you say to yourself! Now Friedman is going to tell us why civilian civil society is better than the military at playing a moderating role between the various factions in a country that just had a revolution. But instead of getting this, you get a slap in the face. It comes in this form: “And that leads to those numbers.” What a disappointment, from the superstition of the comparison, the Jew slips into the superstition of numerology, giving no explanation as to why he believes one moderator is better than the other.

As to the numbers, he elaborates that depending on what the people of a country want, what they will or will not accept, and how their temperament has been forged, they might need one Mandela to unify them; 5,000 peacekeepers to police the partition lines between them like it was done in Bosnia and Lebanon; or 500,000 troops to do a few things like it was done in Iraq – a country that Friedman does not mention because of what he finally admits: “Even then, failure is a real option.”

So you ask in exasperation: What do we have here? The whole thing might blow up in Tunisia at any time. An Iraq style failure is real in the places where America may again be tempted to poke its nose. So why not root for the Egyptian model? Are these people not lucky to have a powerful military; one that can impose discipline where and when it will be necessary during the transition period? After all, calling on peacekeepers like it was done in Bosnia, Lebanon and Iraq is calling on someone else's military. Why not one's own military?

Yes, a few decent people may be swept along with the bad guys, but this happens in every revolution. It is partly the fault of the strong faction that takes control of the situation and rules with impatience. It is also partly the fault of the decent people who fail to see that the time has come to curtail their revolutionary fervor, and give the country a chance to stabilize so that the millions of other ordinary people can get back to normal – live their lives, raise their children and rebuild the country.

With 4 times the population of Iraq, and three years after the change of regime, Egypt has had 3,000 dead and no refugees whereas Iraq had hundreds of thousands of dead people and millions of refugees. Which is more tolerable?

Finally, who cares what medals are pinned on General Sisi's chest? The one thing we can be certain of is that he will not pin one on Friedman's chest.