Tuesday, March 11, 2014

Economic Lesson from Europe to America

Nothing is more jolting than to believe in something for years and years then find out that the exact opposite is true. Well, my friend, prepare yourself for a jolt because Brian M. Carney brought us the news that Europe has adopted the Milton Friedman capitalist system and remained in recession for the past five years compared to an America that adopted the Keynesian quasi-socialist system and did much better economically.

You can see all this – and a lot more – in the article that was written by Brian Carney under the title: “What Ails the European Economy” and the sub-title: “Jacques de Larosiere says post-panic re-regulation put capital ahead of all other considerations.” It was published in the Wall Street Journal on March 11, 2014.

To explain what is ailing the European Economy in a nutshell, de Larosiere (who was governor of the Central Bank of France and later head of a committee in charge of fixing Europe's banks) spoke about the reforms that took place in Europe then added: “that does not mean that monetary policy, considered broadly, is loose. Europe is in the grip of a 'major deleveraging process' driven by 'very tight banking regulation.'”

He went on to explain that this situation was created by the fact that the banks were required to increase their capital by massive amounts. The result is that they began to reject as much as 48 percent of the applications for loans as opposed to the old normal which was somewhere between 10 and 20 percent.

Another important point came out in the discussion between the two men. It is that “Europe's banks finance three-quarters of the capital needs of the economy. In the US ... bank lending accounts for just one-quarter of the financing of the economy.” He went on to explain that this was done through the process of securitization; relied upon more massively in America than in Europe. But since the crisis of 2008, the word has become a dirty word in Europe, and the process is almost never used now. Thus, securitization is something he likes to revive with modifications that will make them less risky to investors.

Something else came out of the discussion with de Larosiere. He calls it a paradox because in Europe money seems to be “abundantly created by central banks … but when we look at the largest definition of money, there has been no increase … because with one hand, the central banks push money into the system [but] with the other hand, they take away money.” Well, actually, the central banks don't take away the money; they require the commercial banks to increase their capital so as to comply with the Basel III regulations.

But the lesson to be learned here is that the paradox, as de Larosiere calls it; need not remain a paradox anymore. Once the economy recovers, the idea of pushing money into the system to continue making it available cheaply to those who wish to start a business need not be curtailed. It used to be that the central bank did so to check inflation, but checking inflation can now be done not by a tight monetary policy brought about by an increase in the interest rate; it can be done by requiring the banks to increase their reserves, or better yet, by imposing a tax surcharge that will be targeted.

To see this more clearly, we recall that if anything, the bubble examples of the last few years tell us that runaway inflation happens in the economy because one sector such as the real estate or the securities or the high tech leads the way and spills over into the rest of the economy. When this happens, the right thing to do would be to impose a tax surcharge on the offending sector rather than punish the whole economy with a boost in the interest rate. Moreover, the money collected by the surcharge can be used by the government to reduce its debt and prepare itself for whatever contingency may still result.

Another lesson you draw from the Carney article is that banks using a high percentage of the money with which they operate to do their own trading, are the ones that get into trouble more often and require a bailout. And what this says is that if new regulations are contemplated by the overseeing bodies – whatever they may be – should first and foremost look at this side of the bank activities before anything else.