Saturday, April 11, 2015

First Kristol, now Makovsky talking Bunk

The argument goes something like this: We don't know what we don't know, and this is why we must bomb them. It is that it may turn out we should have known something we didn't know but had we known, we would have bombed. So let's do that now and be on the safe side … just in case.

The bunk does not stop here. It goes on to add something to this effect: And by the way, we know they have been cheating because if we don't know what we don't know, it is that they are hiding something. And they would not be hiding something unless they did not want us to see it. Which is all the more reason why we must bomb them now and get it over with.

This is what you find at the core of the Michael Makovsky article which came under the title: “Iran's Cheating” and the subtitle: “Can't trust, can't verify.” It was published in the Weekly Standard, one day after the William Kristol article: “Unravel the Deal” in which he describes how to go about getting the mentally retarded of the Congress to bankrupt America and send its children to die for the glory of Israel.

He begins with the Jewish thing to do, which is to pluck from the air a statement that, if true, would confirm what he says, and presents said statement as the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. He then builds on that fallacy by constructing an “Alice in Wonderland” sort of Jewish fantasy which he tries to make the deficient in the Congress believe is the reality of what goes on in the world today.

The fallacy on which Makovsky chose to build his case this time is not only the Jewish thing to do; it is the VERY Jewish thing to do. It is to accuse someone of doing what the Jews normally do … that is, to accuse a gentile of acting like a Jew. Here is what he has plucked from the air this time: “The President [Obama] insisted on April 2, that 'Iran has met all of its obligations.' This is demonstrably false.” The trouble is that Makovsky demonstrates nothing because there is nothing he can demonstrate. All he can do, sitting in his Washington office, is to pluck from the air statements not worth the toilet paper that would wipe them. Here is an example of that: “In the past year alone Iran violated its international agreements at least three times.”

This done, he comes to the theme of “we don't know what we don't know, so let’s bomb them now” by quoting Obama as saying that “inspectors will have unprecedented access to the entire supply chain supporting Iran's nuclear program … With this deal [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)] Iran will face more inspections than any other country in the world.” And so Makovsky comments that “heretofore the monitoring effort created after the 1990-91 Gulf war [UNSCOM] … could not verify that Saddam had completely disarmed.” Saying this much, he ignores the fact that a great deal has been learned since that time, which is why the new monitoring system will be “unprecedented” … like says the President.

To counter this, Makovsky relies once again on the Jewish thing to do, plucking from the air this statement: “The inspection regime contemplated in the JCPOA seems woeful in comparison.” Believing he has a Smart Aleck quip he can hide behind this time, he mentions the Additional Protocol (AP) whose application “would represent a major advance beyond the current measures.” But he goes on to say, there is a problem because “this provision … makes it impossible to know what measures Iran will end up being bound by.” In other words, we don't know what we don't know, so let's bomb them now.”

Here is how he builds up to the Smart Aleck quip. He tells that the AP provides for the conduct of “anytime, anywhere” sort of inspections that include Iran's uranium mines and centrifuge factories.” And here is how he drops his Smart Aleck bombshell: “If Iran decides to sprint to the nuke, however, it won't do so in a uranium mine; it will do it at one of its enrichment plants.”

With this, the man just shoved his foot in his mouth. Here is how and why: Sitting in his office in Washington or at home, he could only visualize inspectors (as in the late night TV shows) going to places looking for the bomb and discovering it in a warehouse. But this is not how things happen in real life.

What happens in this kind of inspections is that technicians rely on the fact that metals and minerals of the same mine have a signature they carry with them anywhere they are transported. Knowing the signature of every mine in Iran and that of the foreign mines that may supply it with additional feedstock, will tell the inspectors if Iran has brought in foreign supplies or has shipped out any of its own. When this is added to the knowledge of how uranium changes in weight and size as it moves through the process of being refined, it will tell the inspectors what exactly the Iranians have been doing.

Well, it looks like someone has tried in vain to explain all this to Makovsky who could not grasp it. It is why, perhaps, he wrote at the top of the article: “Some will assess the truth by crunching the centrifuges and uranium stockpile numbers. However vital such analysis will be, it is important not to lose sight of the nukes for the Centrifuges.”

Yes, Michael. It is also important that you let the big boys do the work that big boys do, and find something for you to play with till they are done with their work. You could then ask them to give you the results of their work since you cannot grasp the process by which they reach those results.