Henry Kissinger and George P. Shultz describe the framework
concluded between the (P5+1) and Iran as dispassionately as they can
… which is a refreshing development given what has poured out the pens of other
writers lately. Our two authors discuss their findings in the article they
wrote jointly under the title: “The Iran Deal and Its Consequences,” and the
subtitle: “Mixing shrewd diplomacy with defiance of U.N. resolutions, Iran has turned
the negotiations on its head.” It was published on April 8, 2015 in the Wall
Street Journal.
It can be said that despite a few exceptions, the analysis
is even-handed in the way that it treats all sides in this undertaking. For
this reason, the diagnosis that Kissinger and Shultz made of the realities they
chose to look at, comes close to being correct. The cautious note to insert at
this point, however, is that they neglected to mention other realities ... such
as the reaction of America 's
partners in the (P5+1) group, and the possible consequences of such reactions.
Where Kissinger and Shultz make a serious mistake, is in the
cure they prescribe. Ignoring the fact that it was America's meddling in Iran's
political process in the middle of the last century that created the animosity
between the two nations, the authors now suggest that more American involvement
rather than less is needed to stabilize the region. And they seem to brush
aside the notion that America 's
support for Saddam Hussein who launched an unprovoked murderous war against
them, is what motivated the Iranians to develop the formidable military
industrial complex they now possess.
The Kissinger-Shultz article clearly shows that Iran is too big
and too capable to treat like the enemy you cannot trust, therefore must
restrain the way that Lilliputians would restrain a Gulliver. Despite the fact
that “the significance of the framework will depend on its verifiability and
enforceability” they admit that “the physical magnitude of the effort is
daunting.” And they explain: “Iran
is in a position to violate the agreement by executive decision. Restoring the
sanctions will require coordinated international action.”
With these difficulties in mind, the two authors take up the
argument advanced by others, saying that: “Unless political restraint is linked
to nuclear restraint, freeing Iran
from sanctions risks empowering its hegemonic effort.” They counter it with the
argument which says that the nuclear deal will help the “domestic
transformation of Iran .”
And so, they advance their own view, which is to ask the question: “What gives
us the confidence that we [can] predict Iran 's
domestic course [better] than Vietnam 's,
Afghanistan 's, Iraq 's, Syria 's,
Egypt 's or Libya 's?”
In the face of these difficulties and the possibility that
“for Iran 's neighbors, the
agreement is a dangerous prelude,“ Kissinger and Shultz mention that “some have
suggested the U.S. can
dissuade Iran 's
neighbors from developing capabilities by extending an American nuclear
umbrella to them.” And so, they put forth their own argument in the form of a
series of questions, showing the difficulties that come with that suggestion.
One such question has tipped their hand as to what they were
thinking about when they wrote that passage. Here is the question: “What if
nuclear weapons are employed as psychological blackmail?” They could only have
been thinking about the dirty game that the Israelis have been playing – under America 's protection – for a number of decades
with their policy of “nuclear ambiguity,” despite the fact that the American
umbrella was extended to them … as it became evident during the 1973 Egyptian
offensive to kick Israel
out of the Sinai.
Thus, the two authors conclude that the agreement has the
potential to end Iran 's
hostility to the West, and to enlist it in the effort to stabilize the Middle East . But they see great difficulties in such
effort because “there exists no current evidence that Iran and the U.S. are near such an
understanding.” Perhaps this is true. But if so, there is a way out of these
difficulties. It is for America
to publicly call on Israel
to come clean with its nuclear program if, indeed, it has one. Accompanying
such call would be the start of an effort to render the Middle
East free of nuclear weapons.
The problems of the region can be solved as simply as that.
What stands in the way is Israel 's
desire to look bigger and more important than it is, and America 's
willingness to sacrifice its economic and military superpower status as well as
the lives of its young men and women to protect that Israeli desire. What a
tradeoff!