An important element at the basis of a culture that is built
on superstition is that it confuses form with substance. This reality is shown
in the column that was written by Bret Stephens under the title: “The Best
Arguments for an Iran Deal” and the subtitle: “The heroic assumptions, and
false premises, of our diplomacy.” It was published on July 14, 2015 in the
Wall Street Journal.
The literary style that Stephens is using to develop his
argument consists of anticipating the arguments that his opponents will use to
defend the Iran
nuclear deal, and try to demolish them before they are made. In fact, he seems
to have gotten a hint of what such arguments will sound like because, as he
says, the deal's “apologists are already trotting out excuses.”
He begins with what he calls “The heroic case.” It is to
draw a parallel between Iran 's
Ali Khamenei and China 's Mao
Zedong … and between Iran 's
Hasan Rouhani and China 's
Deng Xiaoping. Stephens says that an argument can be made to the effect that in
the same way China became a
de facto ally of the United States
during the Cold War in response to America
softening its stance toward China ;
Iran
might be inclined to do the same in response to the nuclear deal. But he
quickly seeks to demolish this argument.
To that end, he says that the analogy is imperfect. To prove
it, he points to what he says was a China
under Mao that faced an overwhelming external threat from the former Soviet Union . He compares that situation with Iran 's string of current strategic successes in
the region, and concludes that as a result, “Beijing
ratcheted down tensions with Washington , Tehran ratchets them up.”
This leads him to put out the following challenge: “If there is evidence of an
Iranian trend toward moderation it behooves proponents of a deal to show it.”
Well, let's assume at the start that the historic facts and
the current facts as laid out by Stephens are true. Because of his
superstitious belief that non-Jews are evil by nature, he sees them responding
to the crack of the whip (the form) rather than acts of human redemption (the
substance). And so, he believes that because China
was fearful and Iran is not,
China played ping pong
whereas Iran
got into the business of seizing cargo ships.
But the truth is that his historic and current facts are
totally false. The two Communist nations relished rubbing America 's nose in the Vietnamese mud by
supplying the North as well as the Vietcong with weapons; all of which went to Vietnam overland through China . The
truth is that China and the USSR were
allies, and remain so to this day. At some point the strength of the alliance
softened a little, but the two giants never became enemies. By contrast, Iran
is facing America's option that's permanently on the table; also facing
Israel's song of the clowns, expressed in the form of American-made Israeli
warplanes flying westward as far as they would need to in the eastern direction
to “take out” Iran's nuclear installations.
Bret Stephens then discusses “The transactional case.” He
says that won't work either because his superstitious belief compels him to
hold the view that “we can't trust Iran .” Despite the UN monitors
saying otherwise, he affirms that there is proof Iran
has tried to cheat in the past – which to him – means Iran will cheat
in the future. He sees no act of redemption here. Also, he does not trust the
American government standing up to Iran
when the two will differ on regional matters … at which point he sees Iran holding the deal hostage and dictating
terms for America 's broader Mideast policy.
From there, Stephens shifts to “The defeatist case.” But as
you read this passage, you discover he has a hard-to-explain superstitious
belief in the usefulness of a septic tank passing as think tank, and
fantasizing about defending the democracies. This is like saying pigs can fly,
so you dismiss the whole thing as no more worthy than a bucketful of pig
manure. You go on to the next point which comes under the rubric: “Good luck.”
Here, Stephens quotes Bismarck who may have equated
drunkards, fools and America ,
saying basically that even they could get lucky once in a while. And so, our
author projects that America
may get lucky again when Mr. Khamenei passes away. That's when the international
monitors may be permitted to do their job, thus prove that John Kerry was the
good negotiator who negotiated the best possible deal.