Wednesday, June 24, 2015

The fatal Flaw in Alan Kuperman's Reasoning

No matter how much education an individual has, if obsessed with something, his ability to think rationally will diminish or get killed by the obsession. This is the lesson you come out with when you read Alan J. Kuperman's article: “The Iran Deal's Fatal Flaw” published on June 23, 2015 in the New York Times.

He unveils his obsession near the end of the article with these words: “Showering Iran with rewards poses grave risks.” This is the conclusion he reaches by following a reasoning that is so flawed, you wonder what demonic force is working on him – and working on all those like him. The bone of contention on which he builds his thesis is the duration of the so-called break-out time that Iran will need to put together a nuclear bomb before … before … yeah, please tell before what. … Let's say, he means before something. Yes, it is something he does not tell. He does not because he knows not what to say that will scare people yet prove to be credible.

But because the break-out time is the very squabble over which the great debate has erupted, Kuperman was compelled to say something … and so he said the thing that says nothing. Here is how he formulated this part of his contribution to the debate: “By my calculations, Iran's actual breakout time would be three months – not over a year. Thus, the deal would be unlikely to improve the world's ability to react to a sudden effort by Iran to build a bomb.”

So that's what he calls grave risks. He wants the world to believe that the Iranians have it within them to wake up one morning, make “a dash for the bomb,” and the world will not have the time to react. But the question remains: React to what exactly? Is it, react to the Iranians waking up that morning? Making a dash for the bomb? Having a bomb they did not test that may not work? Having a bomb they did not test that may work? Suppose they do make the bomb, and the world reacts at this point. What would be the difference between the world reacting before this point or after it?

Kuperman is not answering that question because obsession has robbed him of the reasoning that would have taken him thus far. This is where his credibility – and that of others like him – crumbles. In fact, his presentation is nothing more than the expression of his obsession. It has nothing to do with the real world that Iran and six negotiating partners are grappling with.

While this is the real world in which we live, Kuperman and all those like him live in another world and another reality. It is a fantasy which he describes with these words: “In the real-world breakout, Iran would race, not crawl, to the bomb.” So there you have it. Not only does he know for sure that the Iranians will build the bomb, he knows what kind of bomb they will race to. It will not be a bomb that will “require 59 pounds of weapons-grade uranium,” it will be one that “us[es] just 29 pounds of weapons-grade uranium,” he says.

But suppose the thought had occurred to Kuperman and to those like him that Iran dashing to the bomb in a month or a year changes nothing because standing at the threshold of having it, or actually having it will make no difference from the standpoint of the world reacting to the event. If the Iranians mention the bomb to threaten someone or if they test it or use it on someone, the big powers will wipe them off the map before they had the time to build the arsenal that could deter the world from reacting.

If Kuperman and those like him thought of that and they are not saying it, the question becomes: Why are they raising all that fuss? What do they really want? And there can be only one answer to these questions. Because they failed to get America to destroy Iran the way it did Iraq, they want America to at least destroy the Iranian economy by maintaining the sanctions indefinitely.

This is perhaps why Kuperman writes: “Obama's argument – extending Iran's breakout time – turns out to be worthless,” and says right after that: “infusing Iran's economy with … $30 billion to $50 billion … would entrench the ruling mullahs, who could claim credit for Iran's economic resurgence.”

That's what these people want; because Obama will not bomb Iran, they call on the congress of fools to wreck the Iranian economy in the hope of sparking a revolution. They dream this will result in changing the regime and possibly turn the country into another Libya. If not an Iraq, they will settle for a Libya – at least for now.

These characters never change, and that's why they always end up you know where.